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Introduction
A young girl is shot in the face, leaving a gaping hole in her cheek for
over 25 years.1 A four-year old girl is born with an exposed bladder.2 Seven
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1. Australia Approves Ayaan’s Visa!, EDNA ADAN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, http://www.
ednahospital.org/2014/01/australia-approves-ayaans-visa/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2014).
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children have hydrocephalus, causing their brains to swell with fluid that
needs to be drained through sophisticated procedure.3
These are just a few of the patients seen in the only maternity hospital
in Somaliland. It is the only maternity hospital in the nation, due in part to
limited funding opportunities for maternal and child health. Each of these
stories ends in success, but not because of international organizations that
donate directly to foreign governments. Why are international organiza-
tions not part of this success?
Somaliland does not have access to foreign aid because it has not been
recognized by the international community as a state.4 Somaliland is a
semi-autonomous region in the Horn of Africa,5 which was under the Brit-
ish Protectorate until June 26, 1960, when the nation declared its indepen-
dence.6  For the next five days, the United Nations and thirty-five
countries— including the United States— recognized Somaliland as an inde-
pendent nation.7  On July 1, 1960, Somaliland united with its neighbor to
the south, Italian Somalia.8  With unification came the fulfillment of a
decades-long campaign for a “Greater Somalia.”  It became immediately
clear, however, that although the majority of the unified population shared
the same ethnicity, religion, and language, these were sharply distinct
nations.9  Despite stark differences, there still was promise for “Greater
Somalia” until 1969, when President Sharmarke was assassinated in an
otherwise bloodless coup.10  The Siyad Barre regime that followed led to a
devastating Civil War that left 250,000 to 300,000 people— mostly
marginalized Somalilanders, such as the Bantu, Digil, Bravani, and
Rahanweyn— dead.11  In May of 1991, Somalis residing in the North con-
vened in the Grand Conference of the Northern Peoples.12  At the confer-
ence, Somaliland revoked the Act of Union that had legitimized the
unionization of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia, and declared its
2. Edna Assists Baby Hoodo, EDNA ADAN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, http://www.ednahos-
pital.org/2013/08/edna-assists-baby-hoodo/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2014).
3. Recent Achievements at Edna Hospital, EDNA ADAN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, http://
www.ednahospital.org/2011/03/recent-achievements-at-edna-hospital/ (last visited Aug
8, 2014).
4. Ed Stoddard, Somaliland blessed by dodging aid ‘curse’: minister, REUTERS (Feb. 4,
2014, 12:05pm), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/04/us-africa-mining-somali-
land-idUSBREA1316Y20140204 (last visited Aug. 8, 2014).
5. MARK BRADBURY, BECOMING SOMALILAND 4 (2008).
6. Id. at 32.
7. Peter J. Schraeder, Why the United States Should Recognize Somaliland’s Indepen-
dence, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, https://csis.org/print/13836 (last visited
Apr. 10, 2014).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 32 (“The former colonies had developed
different administrative systems, police forces, taxes, currencies and education systems,
and they conducted official affairs in different languages.”).
10. See id. at 35.
11. See id. at 47.  Somalia’s government led a counter-offense attack in Hargeisa and
Burco, the two major cities of Somaliland that killed “tens of thousands of civilians [and]
forced hundreds of thousands to seek refuge in Ethiopia.” Id. at 45-46.
12. Id. at 80.
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independence.13
Since 1991, Somaliland has flourished with the emergence of a strong
democratic government14 and economic growth.15  Despite Somaliland’s
high-functioning government, Somaliland is not recognized as an indepen-
dent state within the international community; instead, the international
community recognizes Somalia as the territorial sovereign of Somaliland.16
Somalia, however, has not been able to exert any semblance of control over
Somaliland because of Somalia’s status as a failed state.17  For over twenty
years, the international community has hesitated to recognize Somaliland
as an independent state due to narrow conceptualizations of self-determi-
nation and sovereignty.
Traditional notions of sovereignty and self-determination are not eas-
ily applicable to unique claims for independence, such as those at issue in
Somaliland.  Classic definitions describe sovereignty as “the absolute and
perpetual power of a commonwealth.”18  Sovereignty, at its core, goes to
the rights of a state.  In contrast, self-determination goes to a people’s right
to decide which state governs them.
Self-determination in international law is the legal right for a “people”
to attain a certain degree of autonomy from its sovereign.19  Traditionally,
the right to self-determination is available to all colonized groups.20  By
1970, many states had attained international recognition as the conclusion
13. Id. at 82.
14. See, e.g., id. at 184.  Since 1991, Somaliland has held two democratic elections
that were observed by the international community. See also id. at 192-93.  Further-
more, the U.S.-based International Republican Institute and the National Endowment for
Democracy highlighted Somaliland’s democratic success, stating “Somaliland’s embrace
of democracy, its persistence in holding round after round of elections, both winners
and losers abiding by the rules, the involvement of the grassroots, the positive role of
traditional authorities, the culture of negotiation and conflict resolution, the temperance
of ethnicity or clan affiliation and its deployment for constructive purposes, the adapta-
tion of modern technology, the conservative use of limited resources, and the support of
the diaspora and the professional and intellectual classes are some of the more outstand-
ing features of Somaliland’s political culture that are often sorely lacking elsewhere.” See
Schraeder, supra note 4, at 2.
15. See, e.g., Nicholas Eubank, Taxation, Political Accountability, and Foreign Aid: Les-
sons from Somaliland, JOURNAL OF DEV. STUDIES (forthcoming Mar. 26, 2011), at 7.
16. See, e.g., BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 5 (“Most fundamentally, after a decade and a
half Somaliland’s sovereignty claim remains unrecognized by Somalis in Somalia or any
foreign government, and is contested by a significant proportion of the people populat-
ing eastern Sanaag and Sool regions of Somaliland.”).
17. See, e.g., Brian Jones, The Worst Place in the World: See What Life is Like in
Somalia, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 19, 2013, 11:09 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
somalia-is-the-most-failed-state-on-earth-2013-7?op=1.  However, Somalia’s government
was recently recognized as functional by the United States. See, e.g., Tom Watkins, After
More Than 2 Decades, U.S. Recognizes Somalia, CNN (Jan. 17, 2013, 5:31 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2013/01/17/us/somalia-recognition/.
18. RICHARD JOYCE, COMPETING SOVEREIGNTIES 47 (2013).
19. See, e.g., Self-Determination (International Law), LEGAL INFO. INST. (Mar. 23,
2014), http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/self_determination_international_law.
20. MILENA STERIO, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 9
(2013).
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to the decolonization process.21  Over time, however, the international
community has grown to regard self-determination with suspicion due to
frequent attempts by separatist minority groups to challenge a state’s terri-
torial integrity.22  To prevent these separatist challenges, limitations to self-
determination have developed.  Both external and internal limitations to
self-determination make it nearly impossible for a non-colonized people to
obtain independence, including Somalilanders,23 due to strict adherence to
Somalia’s right to territorial sovereignty.  But Somaliland has continued to
act as an independent state, which has left people in both nations con-
fused.  The tension between the traditional notions of sovereignty and self-
determination has led the world to ignore Somaliland’s democratic and
economic achievements.  For reasons that will be explored in this paper,
Somaliland’s intent to function as an independent state should no longer
be ignored.
This Note argues that Somaliland’s commitment to independence
highlights an inability to reconcile traditional notions of sovereignty with
self-determination.  This tension can be resolved through a flexible,
nuanced approach to both concepts that still preserves the spirit of sover-
eignty and self-determination.  Part I discusses the history of Somaliland,
including its independence from the British, unification with Italian
Somalia, and reassertion of independence in 1991.  Part II discusses the
traditional definitions of sovereignty and the shift to a modern understand-
ing of sovereignty.  Part III discusses the evolution of the right to self-deter-
mination and the underlying theories that motivate international support
for the right of a people to choose who governs them.  Part IV discusses the
tension between sovereignty and self-determination.  Part V provides a
potential remedy to alleviate the tension with an analysis of the emerging
doctrine of earned sovereignty as applied to Somaliland.
I. The Struggle for Independence in Somaliland
A. Creation of “Greater Somalia”
Prior to 1960, Somaliland (North) and Somalia (South) were two dis-
tinct nations.24  Beginning in the late nineteenth century, Great Britain
began to occupy the coastal regions of Somaliland.25  Initially, Britain’s
interest in Somaliland was limited to commercial and geopolitical interests,
primarily the protection of valuable trade routes to Asia.26  After twenty
years of uprisings by Somalis, the British began to expand their control
inland.27  Despite expansion, Britain maintained a system of indirect rule,
which limited the “resistance to colonialism by reinforcing traditional
21. Id. at 11-12.
22. Id. at 18.
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 32.
25. Id. at 25.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 27-29.  Even though Great Britain expanded further into Somaliland, Great
Britain was not interested in making Somaliland a formal colony.  Britain’s use of “indi-
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forms of authority.”28  The British maintained this system by working
within Somaliland’s clan-based hierarchy and elevating clan elders to posi-
tions with state authority.29
While limited investment in British Somaliland left rural society
largely untouched and did not significantly alter the country’s political
structure, Italy engaged in a brutal assault on Somalis living in Italian
Somalia.30  As the Italian government established its sphere of influence in
Italian Somalia, World War II broke out.31  The Italians briefly occupied
British Somaliland in 1941, but were pushed back into Italian Somalia and
Ethiopia.  In 1948, Somaliland became a British Protectorate while Italian
Somalia was placed under U.N. Trusteeship.32
After World War II, a rise in Somali nationalism took over the region.
The concept of a “Greater Somalia” was pursued vigorously with blind
faith, overshadowing the underlying historical, political and economic dif-
ferences between the two regions.33 The goal of a “Greater Somalia” was to
unite the predominantly Somali regions of East Africa.34  However, there
was no agenda for addressing the distinct problems regarding
underdevelopment in both nations, nor did anyone consider the mechanics
of integrating the two territories.35  Simply put, no one paid attention to
merging the two regions’ separate institutions.  For example, British Soma-
liland and Italian Somalia had different administrative systems, police
forces, taxes, currencies and education systems, and they conducted offi-
cial affairs in different languages.36  This dual colonial heritage led to fur-
ther fragmentation of the legal system, which was tasked with unifying and
reconciling four distinct legal traditions.37
Ultimately, political actors ignored these cracks in the “Greater
Somalia” scheme.  Intellectual and political elites in British Somaliland and
rect rule” in Somaliland was yet another reason why Somaliland and Italian Somalia
clashed; Italian Somalia was governed more aggressively by Italy. See id. at 28.
28. Id. at 28-29.  “[O]ne legacy of indirect rule in Somaliland was to reinforce indige-
nous political institutions in a way that has proved vital to the ability of people in Soma-
liland to reconstitute a polity in the aftermath of the civil war.” Id. at 29.
29. Id. at 28-29. (“As new forms of wealth accumulated in the state, the role of clan
leadership changed from managing kinship relations and entitlements to pastoral
resources to also managing access to the political and economic benefits of the state,
such as the right to export [licenses], the collection of taxes or the ownership of wells.”).
30. Id. at 29. For example, an Italian company was accused of perpetuating slavery
in 1900.  Italy wanted to both create a colony as a source of primary goods and a place
for settlement.
31. Id. at 30 (noting that for a brief time during World War II, Italy occupied Somali-
land, but the British managed to reclaim Somaliland in 1941).
32. Id. at 31 (granting independence was scheduled for 1960).
33. Id. at 32.
34. Id. at 24 (“Aspirations of Somalis to re-unite the ‘lost’ Somali territories in a
Greater Somalia have subsequently driven national politics and regional conflicts.”).
Greater Somalia would have united five regions: Djibouti, Ogaden in Ethiopia, North-
eastern Kenya, British Somaliland, and Italian Somalia. Id.
35. Id. at 32.
36. Id.
37. Id. (“The new Republic had four distinct legal traditions: British common law,
Italian law, Islamic shari’a and Somali customary law.”).
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Italian Somalia discussed unification as early as April 1960.38  On June 26,
1960, Somaliland obtained independence from Great Britain.39 Five days
later, Italian Somalia also declared independence.40  That same day, in a
rush towards unification, the two nations became Somalia.41
After unification, the two nations tried to bridge the gap between their
respective political and administrative frameworks only to find resistance
from the other nation.  A day after decolonization from the British, Somali-
land drafted and signed an Act of Union, thus validating unification with
Italian Somalia.42  To legally bind both states, representatives of the South
needed to sign the document as well;43  instead, the South passed the Atto
di Unione, which differed significantly from the North’s Act of Union.44  In
response, Northerners declared that the Atto di Unione did not carry the
force of law because the document had never been ratified by the Somali-
land legislature.45  The North’s dissatisfaction was ignored.  The North reg-
istered its discontent when more than half of the Northern electorate voted
against the provisional constitution.46  Later that same year, British-trained
Northern officers attempted a coup to end the Union and failed.47  The
North only began to accept the Union when Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, an
Isaaq and Somaliland’s former Prime Minister, was appointed Prime Minis-
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. The schedule of U.N. trusteeship declared Italian Somalia would
decolonize by July 1, 1960.
41. Id. But, unlike half the marriages in the U.S., this unification could not be
annulled. See National Marriage and Divorce Trends, CDC.ORG, (last visited Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm.
42. BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 33.
43. See id.
44. Ibrahim Hashi Jama, Somaliland & Somalia: The 1960 Act of Union –  An Early
Lesson for Somaliland, SOMALILAND LAND (2006), http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Soma-
liland_Act_of_Union.htm (“Thus, although the clear plan and agreement between Soma-
liland and Somalia was that the same Act of Union will be signed by both states, the
legal formalities, as agreed, were not completed properly and, according to [author
Paolo] Contini, ‘the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law did not have any legal valid-
ity in the South (Somalia) and the approval “in principle” of the Atto di Unione was not
sufficient to make it legally binding in that territory.” See also Dimitrios Lalos, Between
Statehood and Somalia: Reflections of Somaliland Statehood, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 789, 792 (2011).
45. See BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 33. See also Jama, supra note 44 (“[Author Eugene]
Cotran comments that the legal validity of the legislative instruments establishing the
union were ‘questionable’ and he summarizes the reasons as follows: (a) The Union of
Somaliland and Somalia Law and the Somalia Act of Union were both drafted in the
form of bilateral agreements, but neither of them was signed by the representatives of
the two territories. (b) The Union of Somaliland and Somalia purported to derogate in
some respects from the Constitution of the Somali Republic. (c) The Somalia Act of
Union was approved ‘in principle’ but never enacted into law. (d) The decree law of July
1, 1960, did not come into effect since it was not converted into law in accordance with
the Constitution.”
46. BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 33. The vote, however, was carried by a majority in the
South although the legitimacy of the vote is questionable. Id.
47. Id. “Charges of treason against them were dismissed by a judge on the grounds
that, in the absence of an Act of Union, the court had no jurisdiction over Somaliland.
The rejectionists [of the Atto di Unione] took this as vindication of their case.” Id.
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ter of Somalia in 1967.48  Unfortunately this moment of acceptance was all
too brief.  In October of 1969, President Sharmarke was assassinated and
Siyad Barre took over Somalia in a bloodless coup.49  Somalia’s unified
democracy lasted only nine years.50
B. Collapse of Somalia and Rise of Somaliland
Barre hoped to fulfill the promise of “Greater Somalia” through the
creation of a military state which, at its peak, emphasized nationalism and
loyalty.51  Barre promoted nationalism by getting the international commu-
nity invested in the “Greater Somalia” movement.52  Somalia received sup-
port from the Soviet Union, China, and the Middle East to recapture all five
regions.53  After losing the Ogaden War, Somalia lost these benefactors, but
soon gained the support of the United States, Italy, and other Western
donors.54  The ideology behind a “Greater Somalia” began to disintegrate
due to both the loss of the war with Ethiopia over Ogaden and the decision
of the people in Djibouti to seek independence rather than unite with
Somalia.55
The loss of nationalism combined with the creation of a military state
led to the formation of rebel groups.  In 1981, the Isaaq clan that resided in
the North formed the Somaliland National Movement (SNM).56  The crisis
between the North and South escalated in May of 1988 when the South
signed a peace agreement with Ethiopia.57  Fearing that the North would
soon lose its military bases after Somalia’s new alignment with Ethiopia,
the SNM attacked the Somali army in the Northern cities.58  To undermine
support, Barre directed offensive military strikes at the North’s two major
cities: Hargeisa and Burco.59  Barre sent pilots to bomb civilians through-
out the North as well.  Over 50,000 Northerners were killed in major
48. Id. at 34.
49. Id. at 35 (stating that a military regime governed Somalia for the next 21 years
under the Somali Revolutionary Council.  Major-General Siad Barre was the leader of the
coup, and the next President of Somalia).
50. Id. at 33– 35.
51. Id. at 36 (saying Barre also promoted loyalty by campaigning against tribalism
by, among other means, ceremonial burning of effigies of tribalism, elimination of blood
compensation, and the stripping of marriages of their clan significance). See also I.M.
LEWIS, A MODERN HISTORY OF THE SOMALI 209-11 (4th ed. 2002).
52. See, e.g., BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 42.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 42, 44-45 (noting that motivations for Western involvement was, in part,
due to concerns that the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, Libya and some of the Gulf States (such
as Iran and Yemen) could prevent access to Middle East oil).
55. See id.
56. Id. at 39.
57. Id. at 45-46.
58. Id.
59. See Brad Poore, Somaliland: Shackled to a Failed State, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 117,
129 (2009) (quoting 417 Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (2004) 273WH (statement of Tony
Worthington)). Hargeisa and Burao are now the primary and secondary capitals of
Somaliland respectively. Interview with Yusuf Xasan, Somaliland citizen, in Hargeisa,
Somaliland (May 1, 2009).
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Northern cities alone,60 and hundreds of thousands died throughout the
rest of the former Protectorate.61  Those who survived the bombings were
subsequently rounded up and shot to death.62
Despite the serious losses, the SNM recaptured all of the major North-
ern cities in 1991.63  Somalia could not continue its widespread atrocities
as it lost funding from Western nations.64  Later that year, the SNM con-
vened in the Great Conference of the Northern Peoples,65 and on May 18,
1991, Somaliland revoked the Atto di Unione and declared independence
from Somalia.66
The international community is unsure how to treat Somaliland’s sec-
ond declaration for independence.  Somaliland has argued that it has
always maintained its independence.67  Furthermore, Somaliland’s borders
reflect its old colonial borders.68  Thus, its second independence consti-
tuted “the dissolution of a voluntary union between sovereign states.”69
The international community, however, is hesitant to intrude on Somalia’s
right to sovereignty and has therefore denied Somaliland’s right to self-
determination.70  Somaliland’s unique situation calls for a deeper under-
standing of sovereignty and self-determination in order to resolve whether
Somaliland should be recognized as an independent state.
II. Sovereignty
A. Origins of Sovereignty
The work of Jean Bodin is one of the earliest sources for the modern
idea of sovereignty.  Bodin defined sovereignty as the “absolute and perpet-
60. Poore, supra note 59.
61. Id. See also DEON GELDENHUYS, CONTESTED STATES IN WORLD POLITICS 131 (2009)
(“By the time the SNM had finally defeated central forces in Somaliland in early 1991,
between 50,000 and 100,000 people may have died in the hostilities and another
500,000 displaced.  [Hargeisa] was roughly 90 per cent destroyed.”).
62. See Poore, supra note 59, at 130.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 44.  The publicity of human rights violations
led many Western donors to withdraw their financial support from Somalia.  For exam-
ple, in January 1990 the US Congress passed the “Brooke Amendment,” which halted
any non-humanitarian aid to Somalia.  “Bilateral aid was cut from US$30 million in
1988, to $740,000 for 1990.” Id.
65. Id. at 80.
66. Id. at 82.
67. See GELDENHUYS, supra note 61, at 132.
68. E.W., Somaliland: Can’t Get No Recognition, THE ECONOMIST (Jan 9, 2014,
7:50am), http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2014/01/somaliland.
69. See GELDENHUYS, supra note 61, at 135.  In fact, Somaliland’s argument is not
unique.  Senegal, Gambia, Mali and Egypt all were allowed to regain their sovereignty
upon the dissolution of unsuccessful unions. Id.  See also Schraeder, supra note 7, at 1
(citing East Timor, Eritrea, and successor states of the former Soviet Union and Yugosla-
via as additional examples).
70. See GELDENHUYS, supra note 61, at 143 (“One reason, especially pertinent in
Africa, was a dogmatic commitment to the sanctity of inherited colonial borders and
hence a deep-seated antipathy to secession.”).
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ual power of a commonwealth.”71  Sovereignty is unlimited in power, func-
tion, and length of time; Bodin claimed that an absolute sovereign
“recognizes nothing after God that is greater than himself.”72  This tradi-
tional notion of sovereignty has faced challenges as the world has increas-
ingly globalized.73  Anne-Marie Slaughter notes that “[t]o exercise
[sovereignty as a supreme authority and control over policy] in a world that
has become so interconnected that people, politics, and pathogens are vir-
tually able to disregard borders requires institutionalized cooperation and
intervention.”74  Going further, Raustiala believes that the shift in sover-
eignty from domestic authority and control to authority and control from
outside institutions represents a loss of sovereignty.75
B. Modern Approach to Sovereignty in Globalized World
To redefine sovereignty in the context of globalization, Stephen Kras-
ner offers four frameworks for conceptualizing sovereignty in the modern
world.76  Krasner first identifies “legal sovereignty,” where states recognize
one another as independent territories.77  Second, Krasner identifies “inter-
dependence sovereignty,” in which a state controls the movements across
its borders.78  Third, Krasner identifies “domestic sovereignty” as the stan-
dard definition of sovereignty.79  “Domestic sovereignty” refers to the effec-
tiveness of governmental authority and control within the state’s
territory.80  Fourth, Krasner identifies “Westphalian sovereignty,” where
states have the right to separately determine their own domestic authority
structures without external interference.81  In addition to his four views on
sovereignty, Krasner provides four situations where sovereignty is trumped
in favor of outside intervention: (1) religious toleration; (2) minority rights;
(3) human rights; and (4) international stability.82
In contrast to Krasner, Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes
have argued that sovereignty has a new meaning as our world becomes
increasingly interdependent:
71. See JOYCE, supra note 18, at 47.
72. Id.
73. Former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said, “It is undeniable that
the centuries-old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands, and
was in fact never so absolute as it was conceived to be in theory.”  Michael P. Scharf,
Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 373
(2004).
74. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40
STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 288 (2004).
75. See Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401, 417
(2000).
76. See STEPHEN D.  KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3 (1999).
77. See id.
78. Id. at 13 (explaining this as an eroding mechanism of sovereignty due to aspects
of globalization (such as capital flows, migration, and ideas) as a way in which the
power of sovereignty in states is being increasingly lessened.).
79. Id. at 11.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 20-21.
82. Id. at 46; see also Slaughter, supra note 74, at 283.
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Our argument . . . is that[ ] for all but a few self-isolated nations, sovereignty
no longer consists in the freedom of states to act independently, in their
perceived self-interest, but in membership in good standing in the regimes
that make up the substance of international life.  To be a player, a state must
submit to the pressures that international regulations impose. . . . Sover-
eignty, in the end— is status— the vindication of the state’s existence as a
member of the international system.83
This “new sovereignty” measures a state’s sovereignty through the abil-
ity and capacity for a state to participate in the international institutions
that allow their members to accomplish tasks that, under Bodin’s notion of
sovereignty, a state could once accomplish alone.84  Chayes’ conceptualiza-
tion of “new sovereignty” can be classified as status, membership, a con-
nection to the rest of the world, and the political ability to be an actor
within it.85  For example, a state that is a member of the United Nations
(U.N.) signifies that the state accepts the right of its fellow U.N. members
to intervene in its domestic affairs if the state has failed in its obligation to
protect its own citizens.  Chayes’ concept of “new sovereignty” represents
centuries of evolution within the doctrine of sovereignty to accommodate
globalization; in contrast, the right to self-determination has barely altered
in form and function since its inception in the early 20th century.
III. Right to Self-Determination
A. Development of the Right to Self-Determination
Prior to World War I, self-determination was not a matter of concern
for the international community.  When a group or national movement
gained independence from its mother states, the rest of the world would
simply acknowledge the group’s statehood.86  Self-determination as a
human right gained momentum post-World War I as Austria-Hungary
broke into different states.87  Leaders such as Vladmir Lenin and Woodrow
Wilson were advocates for self-determination; Lenin advocated violent
secession to liberate people from bourgeois governments, and Wilson
advocated the exercise of free will through the democratic process.88  Wil-
son believed that the essence of the right to self-determination stems from
the general democratic principle of people consenting to be governed.89
Self-determination acquired the status of a legal right after World War
II.90 The U.N. first discussed self-determination as a protected interest in
83. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995).
84. See Slaughter, supra note 74, at 286.
85. Id.
86. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 21-22.
87. Id.; See also SIMONE F. VAN DEN DRIEST, REMEDIAL SECESSION 16 (2013).
88. See ALEKSANDAR PAVKOVIC, CREATING NEW STATES: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SECES-
SION 19-20 (2007).
89. Id.
90. VAN DEN DRIEST, supra note 87, at 16.
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the U.N. Charter.91 While establishing a general right to self-determina-
tion, the U.N. Charter did not specify the criteria necessary for a state to
gain the right.92  Instead, the U.N. Charter proposed that member states
should allow minority groups the opportunity to separate from their
mother state, or the right for colonized peoples to achieve independence.93
Two decades later, the U.N. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights as well as the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Cove-
nants) reaffirmed the right of people to self-determination.94  These two
treaties brought new meaning to self-determination by creating an obliga-
tion for member states to “respect a people’s right to . . . democratic self-
governance.”95  The treaties also expressed self-determination within two
frameworks based on colonization.96  Colonized peoples had a less steep
hill to climb to gain independence compared to non-colonized peoples.
Colonized peoples acquired the right to self-determination automatically
once the Covenants were ratified, whereas non-colonized people did not
automatically acquire the right to seek independence from their mother
states.97
The right to self-determination continued to be widely accepted in the
1950s with the prevalence of colonialism.98  States recognized that
oppressed colonized groups ought to have the right to choose their political
status.99  People living within a colonial territory have a right to self-deter-
mination as a unit; if various ethnic groups live in a single colony, the
colony has to exercise the right to self-determination as a whole.100  All
ethnic groups have to unite as a single “self” that corresponded to the
91. Article 1(2), U.N. Charter provided that one of the purposes of the organization
was “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”  The UN Charter did not define self-
determination. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
92. STERIO, supra note 20, at 10.
93. Id.
94. United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 1, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, 1966; United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 1, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 1966. Article 1 of both covenants provide that: “[a]ll people have the right
to self-determination. . . .  The State Parties to the present Covenant, including those
having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories,
shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that
right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”
95. STERIO, supra note 20, at 11. A distinguishing feature of the two covenants is that
the ICESCR used stronger language towards self-determination, by stating that “all peo-
ples have the right of self-determination” whereas the ICCPR calls for “immediate
respect.” Thomas D. Grant, Review Article: Between Diversity and Disorder: A Review of
Jori C. Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States: Self-Deter-
mination and Statehood, 12 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 629, 634 (1997).
96. STERIO, supra note 20, at 11.
97. Id. The Covenants granted peoples of dependent territories (colonies and trusts)
the right to freely decide their political fate by allowing them “to form an independent
state or to remain a part of their existing colonizer or to associate with another state.” Id.
Colonized states could rely on the Covenants to seek a legally binding separation from
their colonizer. Id.
98. See VAN DEN DRIEST, supra note 87, at 29, 32.
99. Id. at 31.
100. Id. at 31-32.
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entire territory of the colony.101  The one drawback for a colonized group
is that once a colonized people have exercised their right to self-determina-
tion that right expires.102  Once a colonized people form an independent
state, they are classified as non-colonized people. They are then entitled
only to a form of internal governance within their new state.103
Because this right to self-determination expires, self-determination
has lost substantial support.104  Separatist minority groups throughout the
world began challenging the concept of state territorial integrity by calling
for a right to self-determination for their groups.105  A general fear that
numerous minority groups will claim a right to self-determination became
prevalent within the international community.106  In response, nations
have found ways to limit the definition of self-determination through differ-
ent theories of recognition.
B. Theories of Recognition
The ultimate success of a state’s secession is dependent on recognition
by the international community.107  Other nations may recognize the legit-
imacy of secession based on several geopolitical factors.108  There are two
main theories of recognition: the declaratory theory and constitutive the-
ory.109  A state’s recognition is based on an analysis through the
frameworks of one or both theories.
The declaratory theory of recognition is premised on the objective cri-
teria for statehood outlined under the Montevideo Convention.  Signed in
1933, the Montevideo Convention outlined the criteria required for a state
to become recognized: the state must have (1) a permanent population; (2)
a defined territory; (3) effective government; and (4) the capacity to enter
into relations with other states.110  If the four requirements are met, recog-
101. This concept flows from the principle of uti possidetis, leading toward the respect
of colonial borders and their elevation to the status of international frontiers. Id. at 21.
102. Id. at 13.
103. Id. at 11.
104. The popularity of self-determination declined as the prevalence for colonial
states decreased dramatically after the 1970’s. Id. at 13-14. In fact, Professor Van Nanda,
a leading scholar in the self-determination debate, has argued that claims to self-deter-
mination by non-colonial groups would rise quickly, so the international community
should propose a new method of determining the right to self-determination. See, e.g.,
Ved. P. Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law –  The Tragic Tale of Two Cities –
Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AM. J. INT’L L. 321, 322 (1972).
105. STERIO, supra note 20, at 1.
106. Id. at 19. Antonio Cassese commented that “[t]o explore self-determination is
also a way of opening a veritable Pandora’s box” because “[i]n every corner of the globe
peoples are claiming the right to self-determination. Id. at 2.  Former UN Secretary-
General U. Thant went so far as to say: “As far as the question of secession of a particu-
lar section of a State is concerned, the United Nations attitude is unequivocal.  As an
international organization, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept
and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member
States.”  Id. at 25.
107. See id. at 48.
108. See id. at 47.
109. Id. at 48.
110. VAN DEN DRIEST, supra note 87, at 32.
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nition is not necessary; rather, recognition acts instead as evidence of
statehood.111
Domestic and international courts, including federal courts in the
United States and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), have applied the
declaratory theory.112  For example, the Second Circuit applied the declar-
atory standard in Kadic v. Karadzic.113  In Kadic, the court was asked to
determine whether the leadership of Srpska, a self-proclaimed republic,
could be held liable for various human rights atrocities carried out by its
leaders.114  The court held that Srpska met the definition of a state because
Srpska “is alleged to control defined territory, control populations within
this power, and to have entered into agreements with other govern-
ments.”115  Despite this being the favored theory by commentators,116 a
state will still probably not obtain international rights unless the interna-
tional community recognizes it.117
The constitutive theory of recognition reflects the realities of state rec-
ognition by providing that statehood is dependent on recognition by the
international community.118  State recognition is not automatic under the
constitutive theory.119  Existing states act as gatekeepers to ensure that de
facto states meet the criteria under the Montevideo Convention.120 Com-
mentators argue that the gatekeeper function turns recognition into a polit-
ical instrument with powerful states essentially exercising veto power.121
Neither theory is the “correct” or dispositive theory in establishing
statehood recognition.  New states sometimes qualify as a state under the
constitutive theory but not the declaratory theory, and vice versa.122  Ulti-
mately, recognition is not only dependent on the theory used, but is also
dependent on the context surrounding a state’s secession.
111. Id.
112. See e.g. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the existence
of jurisdiction over Radovan Karadzic, President of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb
republic of Srpska).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 236-37.
115. Id. at 245.
116. The declaratory theory is the more favored approach because it is considered to
be the more legal and politically correct framework. See, e.g., William Worster, Sover-
eignty: Two Competing Theories of State Recognition, EXPLORING GEOPOLITICS (Feb. 2010),
http://www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Publication_Worster_Willliam_Sovereignty_Con-
stitutive_Declatory_Statehood_Recognition_Legal_View_International_Law_Court_Jus-
tice_Montevideo_Genocide_Convention.html.
117. STERIO, supra note 20, at 48.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Id. Political maneuvering means that a failed state may remain viable as a politi-
cal tool in the international community.  “[W]here doubts remain as to the factual fulfill-
ment of the requirements necessary for statehood . . . recognition assumes an important
(political) function: it translates international politics determined by domestic policies
into international law.”  Lalos, supra note 44, at 800.
122. Arguably, Bosnia-Herzegovina would not satisfy the criteria for the Montevideo
Convention under the declaratory theory.  Somaliland and Taiwan, however, satisfy the
declaratory theory but fail under the constitutive theory.  See Worster, supra note 116.
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C. Current Status of Self-Determination
Self-determination is a rule of customary international law that
declares the legal right for a “people” to attain a certain degree of auton-
omy from its sovereign.123  The principle of self-determination is currently
embodied in several international treaties and conventions.124  States typi-
cally seek secession in response to the mother state’s failure of governance
and the exclusion of minority groups in running affairs of the state.125
Secession is considered a remedy of last resort “that may come into play
when it is the sole means by which a substate group can exercise its right
of political participation on a basis of equality.”126  Because secession is a
remedy of last resort, a valid exercise of self-determination is difficult to
achieve.  First, a group claiming the right to self-determination must be
categorized as a people, not simply a minority group.127  Second, the peo-
ple’s circumstances must fit under the definition of external self-
determination.128
Self-determination is limited to a group that consider themselves a
“people.”  Generally, a “people” is a group of individuals living in the same
territory.129  A “people” is not defined strictly based on ethnicity, religion,
or language.  The broad construction of “people” is to create a limiting
principle for the right to self-determination.130 The right to self-determina-
tion is not available to minority groups solely based on their minority sta-
tus.131  While all minority groups are entitled to a level of protection by the
mother state, “there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, secur-
ity and economic well-being for all” if every minority group had a right to
self-determination.132  Thus, the distinction between peoples and a minor-
ity group is critical to evaluating a claim for self-determination.
The international community analyzes a group of individuals under a
two-part test to determine whether the group should be categorized as a
123. Some have argued that a state that violates the right of self-determination of its
peoples is “nothing more than a ‘fabricated state’ because it has manipulated statehood.”
Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, CLAIMS TO STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (1994). The
classical view of self-determination— that it’s a right preserved for colonial people— has
acquired jus cogens status. See also Lee Seshagiri, Democratic Disobedience: Reconceiving
Self-Determination and Secession at International Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 553, 567
(2010).
124. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 13.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 20.
127. See id. at 16.
128. See id.
129. See id. See also Grant, supra note 95, at 637 (according to the Permanent Court of
International Justice, “a community is: [A] group of persons living in a given country or
locality, having a race, religion, language and traditions of their own and united by this
identity of race, religion, language, and traditions in a sentiment of solidarity, with a
view to preserving their traditions, maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the
instruction and upbringing of their children in accordance with the spirit and traditions
of their race and rendering mutual assistance to each other”).
130. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 16-17
131. See id.
132. Id. at 18.
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minority group or a “people” for the purposes of self-determination.133 The
test has both an objective and subjective component.  The objective test
evaluates the group to determine to what extent its members share com-
mon characteristics such as race, ethnicity, language, religion, history, and
cultural heritage.134  The international community also determines if the
group of individuals shares a common territory.135  The subjective compo-
nent of the test examines how individuals within the group perceive them-
selves.136  Considerations for the subjective component include a shared
sense of values, a common goal for the group’s future, and the degree to
which the group can form a viable political entity.137  Classification as a
“people” does not demonstrate the right to exercise secession; rather, it
triggers the right to internal self-determination.138
There are two forms of self-determination: internal and external self-
determination.139  The distinction between internal and external self-deter-
mination serves the purpose of limiting secession to extremely narrow cir-
cumstances, because “[t]he right to opposed unilateral secession stands in
obvious tension with the claim to territorial integrity and unity of existing
states.”140  Thus, international law aims to preserve territorial integrity of
existing states, except in truly unique circumstances.141
Internal self-determination is premised on the beliefs that individuals
should have cultural, social, political, linguistic, and religious rights and
that these rights need to be respected by the mother state.142  Internal self-
determination’s focus on social and political rights aligns with Woodrow
Wilson’s belief that self-determination reflects the right to democratic pro-
cess and representation.143  At the end of the 20th century, internal self-
determination gained substantial support when the Supreme Court of
Canada established the right to internal self-determination in Reference re
133. See id. at 16. See also Grant, supra note 95, at 637.
134. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 17.  While all minority groups are entitled to a level
of protection by their mother state, their protection stems from the mother state’s com-
mitment to human rights. See id. at 18.
135. See id. at 16. See also Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. 217, para.
126 (holding that the right to internal self-determination is “a people’s pursuit of its
political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing
state.”).
136. STERIO, supra note 20, at 16.
137. See id. at 16-18.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 21 (quoting Marc Weller).
141. UNESCO, International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the
Rights of Peoples. Final Report and Recommendations, Paris, 22 Feb. 1990, SHS-89/
CONF.602/7, at para. 5 (“There is an understandable fear that, understood in one way,
the peoples’ right to self-determination might lead to the fragmentation of States, the
disruption of settled international boundaries, the breakdown of governmental author-
ity and even manipulation of peoples for the purpose of disrupting the internal affairs of
States.”). See also STERIO, supra note 20, at 19.
142. See also STERIO, supra note 20, at 19.
143. Id.
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Secession of Quebec.144  In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada held
that Quebec cannot unilaterally secede from Canada because the right to
self-determination could only be exercised within the framework of
Canada’s political system.145  A referendum held by Quebecers was insuffi-
cient to trigger the right to self-determination; rather, Canada as a whole
had to vote on whether Quebec could secede from the nation.146  The
Court did hold that the Canadian government would be required to negoti-
ate with Quebec based on the outcome of the referendum.147 According to
the Court, however, only extreme circumstances could override the state’s
interest of territorial integrity.148
External self-determination applies to the small number of cases when
extreme circumstances override the state’s interest of territorial integ-
rity.149  External self-determination signifies that a group of people seeks
to separate from the mother state in order to self-govern.150  External self-
determination stems from the Friendly Relations Declarations, which
states that such separation can take place through the “establishment of
sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with
an independent State, or the emergence into any other political status
freely determined by a people.”151  In practice, the external right to self-
determination is exercised through one of the following methods: the
peaceful dissolution of a State, the reunion or merger of one state with
another state, or secession.152  Reunion or merger is the rare instance
where two or more states unite to create a new sovereign state.153
144. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. 217 (adopting the Declaration
on Friendly Relations’ definition of external self-determination, which is “[t]he establish-
ment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an
independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by
a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that
people”).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. STERIO, supra note 20, at 19.
150. Id.
151. See VAN DEN DRIEST, supra note 87, at 85; See also Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accor-
dance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, UN Doc. A/RES/2625
(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
152. See VAN DEN DRIEST, supra note 87, at 85.  In addition to these modes of imple-
menting the right to external self-determination, the text of the Friendly Relations Decla-
ration concerning the right to self-determination is generally seen to give rise to a right
to independence for the population of a State whose territory has been annexed or occu-
pied by foreign powers.  As such, the exercise of the right to self-determination should
not be viewed as the creation of a new, independent State but as the de facto re-establish-
ment of the independence of a state.  Id.
153. Id. at 86-87.  The state does not need to have been previously united.  An exam-
ple of reunion or merger is the unification of East and West Germany. Id.
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IV. Tension between Sovereignty and Self-Determination
A. Two Jus Cogens Norms at War
There has been difficulty reconciling self-determination with sover-
eignty.  The right to territorial integrity is inherent to sovereignty, but both
self-determination and sovereignty are jus cogens norms that the interna-
tional community has long recognized.  Historically, state recognition was
a necessary requirement for an entity to become a member of the small
community of “civilized” states.154  But the situation changed when France
prematurely recognized the United States. Great Britain viewed France’s
recognition as an intervention in its internal affairs.155  Self-determination
then became “a political and discretionary act ‘determined solely by con-
siderations of convenience or national interests.’”156
In modern society, tension between sovereignty and self-determina-
tion is exacerbated by the use of recognition as a political tool within the
international community.  Self-determination is successful only when the
international community recognizes the state.  However, is the interna-
tional community then asserting sovereignty over an otherwise indepen-
dent state?  Raustiala briefly discusses how “[m]any analysts conceive
sovereignty in terms of ‘local (domestic) authority and control, and thus
the shifting of authority and control to outside (international) institutions
represents a loss of sovereignty.’”157  A further indication of a loss of sover-
eignty is seen with the emergence of provisional sovereignties.  Concern
with provisional sovereignties demonstrates the “pervasive substantive lim-
itations on the capacity of weak states to shape domestic decision-
making.”158
Some critics are not only skeptical of provisional sovereignties, but are
vehemently opposed to any watered-down definition of sovereignty.
Mahmood Mandani argues that there is a “new humanitarian order” that
evolved in response to postwar decolonization.159  Mandani demonstrates
that as former colonies became independent sovereigns, great powers
found a new way to reassert control: by reconstructing humanitarian
law.160  The responsibility arising from a violation of humanitarian law
initially fell on the state which actively engaged in the violation; now, a
violation of humanitarian law falls on the international community.
Because of this newfound duty to protect all vulnerable populations— a
duty embraced in practice by the UN Security Council where all but one
154. See ABDELHAMID EL OUALI, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 198
(2012).
155. Id. at 272.
156. Id.
157. Raustiala, supra note 75, at 417.
158. Aziz Rana and Asli U. Bali, Pax Arabica?: Provisional Sovereignty and Intervention
in the Arab Uprisings, 42 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 321, 323 (2012).
159. See Mahmood Mandani, The New Humanitarian Order, TheNation.com (Sept. 10,
2008), http://www.thenation.com/article/new-humanitarian-order.
160. Id.
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permanent member were former colonizers161— the great powers found a
way to validate their intervention and infringement on sovereignty.
The international community argues against the proposition that it is
reasserting its power by diminishing another state’s sovereignty by claim-
ing there needs to be some limiting principle to the right of self-determina-
tion.  Without the international community acting as a state police, every
minority group will want to assert their right to self-determination.162
This fear has led to a presumption against recognizing states.163  But a
more elaborate explanation of the tension between sovereignty and self-
determination is evident through the rule of the great powers.
B. The Rule of Great Powers: A New Theory of Self-Determination
An alternative theory of self-determination is the great powers rule.
Under this theory, Milena Sterio argues that any entity claiming a right to
self-determination has to demonstrate four criteria for recognition by the
international community.164  Through these criteria, a group receives vali-
dation by the international community to become a state.  The four criteria
include: “a showing by the relevant people that it has been oppressed, that
its central government is relatively weak, that it has been administered by
some international organization or group, and that it has garnered the sup-
port of the most powerful states on our planet.”165  The fourth element to
this rule— support of the most powerful states— carries the most weight and
tends to be dispositive for a successful claim of self-determination.166
Sterio delves further into the rule of great powers by demonstrating
how much power strong nations have over the future of struggling minority
groups and their mother states.  By oppression, Sterio emphasizes the por-
trayal of secessionist groups by the great powers.  The great powers “must
accept that the mother state is at fault and that the minority group repre-
sents the victim” in order for the minority group to claim oppression.167
To determine whether the mother state’s central government is weak, a
great power typically will help weaken that government by strategically aid-
ing a minority group.168  The third prong— involvement of international
161. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council are: China, France,
Russian Federation, the U.K., and the U.S. All but China colonized other parts of the
world: France, Russia, and the U.K. have all colonized parts of the Horn of Africa alone
and the U.S. has colonies in Oceania and the Caribbean. United Nations Security Council
Members, UNITED NATIONS (last visited May 5, 2014), http://www.un.org/en/sc/mem-
bers/.
162. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 20-21.
163. Geldenhuys, Contested States in Africa, SOMALILAND CYBERSPACE (Feb. 17, 2010)
http://www.mbali.info/doc556.htm (“This is coupled with an almost pathological fear
of setting precedents that would encourage disaffected ethnic minorities to break away
from existing states.”).
164. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 57.
165. Id.
166. Sterio goes further to say that the support of the great powers swallows the other
three criteria. Id.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id.
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organizations— is dependent on other nations acknowledging and prioritiz-
ing the minority group’s struggle for self-determination.  This is best
reflected when looking at the United Nations Security Council.  The
United Nations Security Council exercises great control in what groups
receive assistance from the organization.  Five nations— all great powers—
exercise veto power in the Security Council, “thereby precluding any
United Nations’ involvement, if they deem that a self-determination strug-
gle is not worthy of their concern or not deserving of their help.”169  The
great powers support ultimately determines the fate of most minority
groups trying to claim a right to self-determination, fulfilling the fourth
criteria.
C. Defining the Great Powers
In order to apply the rule of great powers, the nations that encompass
the “great powers” must first be defined.  The great powers “are states that
wield the most financial, strategic, political, and military power on our
planet.”170  They have an enhanced status that allows them to exercise
great influence in a coercive manner against other states.  Great powers
also enjoy positions within international institutions, and sometimes
occupy prominent positions.171  Regional organizations and international
courts provide yet another platform for great powers to enjoy an elevated
status.172
The influence of the great powers impedes on the traditional legal and
political power a state may have against other states.  For example, great
powers may engage in interventions, thereby offending other states’ sover-
eignty.173  Great powers have created international tribunals and led crimi-
nal proceedings against leaders from weaker states.174  Through their
immense influence, great powers have reduced the sovereignty of other
states.
The great powers in our modern society include “the United States,
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. In addition to the United Nations Security Council, almost all great powers have
an elevated position within specialized international organizations such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO). Id. at 58.
172. Certain powers routinely have representation on the International Court of Jus-
tice through de facto permanent judges. See id.  Additionally, critics have argued that
the International Criminal Court has become a tool for the great powers, such as the
United States, to target African leaders for crimes in an international forum. See, e.g.,
Mahmood Mandani, The New Humanitarian Order, THE NATION (Sept. 10, 2008), http://
www.thenation.com/print/article/new-humanitarian-order (“[T]ake into account the
four countries where the ICC has launched its investigations: Sudan, Uganda, Central
African Republic and Congo.  All are places where the United States has no major objec-
tion to the course chartered by ICC investigations.  [T]he ICC is rapidly turning into a
Western court to try African crimes against humanity.”).
173. STERIO, supra note 20, at 58.
174. Id.  Some have criticized the great powers for abusing their status to target Afri-
can states in international criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Mandani, supra note 172.
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Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan.”175  Some claim
that China and India are new additions to this exclusive club.176  These
nine nations have attained their status as a great power through different
means.  The United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia achieved their
status through historical privileges after World War II.177  The more recent
additions— China and India— have achieved their status through their enor-
mous industrial growth, manufacturing base, work ethic, and emphasis on
education.178
Others have argued that in addition to historical and newer
powerhouses, two other categories of states deserve the status of great
powers: (1) non-declared nuclear states and(2) rogue and volatile states.179
Non-declared nuclear states, such as Israel and Pakistan, exercise enor-
mous power through the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.  These states
can exercise powers normally reserved for the great powers with the knowl-
edge that few countries would retaliate for fear of nuclear warfare.180
Rogue and volatile states wield power through their extremely unpredict-
able behavior, which makes it difficult for the traditional great powers to
exercise influence.181  Because these states have their own enhanced finan-
cial, political, or military power, they are able to engage in risky diplo-
matic, political, and military actions without concern for retaliation.182
Rogue and volatile states are powerful because they are willing to do almost
anything, rendering great powers helpless to retaliate.  Ultimately, the his-
torical definition of great powers best explains the influence of other
nations on self-determination by analyzing the four criteria and its effect
on self-determination movements throughout the 20th century.
D. Criteria for the Great Powers Approach to Self-Determination
Under the rule of great powers, a group of people seeking self-determi-
nation has to satisfy four criteria: “it has to show that it has been
oppressed, that its central government is relatively weak, that it has already
been administered in some form by some international organization, and
that it has the support of the great powers.”183
175. M.J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver”?
Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great Powers?, 10 UCLA
J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 364, 381 (2005) (stating that the Great Powers can “cross
theoretically unbreachable frontiers either individually or collectively” through some-
what justifiable state interventions).
176. STERIO, supra note 20, at 59.
177. These nations also make up four of the five states with veto power on the United
Nations Security Council.  They attained their seats in part because these four nations
were the only four that had the capacity to fulfill the Security Council’s Article VII power
to take measures against threats to peace. Id. at 45, 58-59.
178. See id. at 59.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 57.
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First, a group typically demonstrates that it is oppressed by getting
international attention through the atrocities it faces at the hands of its
central government.184  Mild human rights violations usually do not
attract enough attention to persuade the great powers to act.185 Therefore,
groups that have satisfied the oppression prong demonstrate “a high level
of suffering and a consistent policy of harsh abuse by the government.”186
For example, the East Timorese demonstrated the abuse they faced under
Indonesia’s power that led to a referendum vote on independence.187  On
the other hand, the Quebecois in Canada were unable to satisfy the oppres-
sion prong because the central Canadian government allowed Quebecois to
participate in high levels of government.188  The international community
ultimately balances the degree of suffering to determine whether it is worth
the effort to interfere with another state’s sovereignty.
Second, a group of people must demonstrate that their mother state’s
central government is relatively weak and incapable of administering to the
people’s province or region.  Groups seeking self-determination easily
demonstrate that their central government is unable to assert proper con-
trol militarily, politically, or structurally.189  Breakaway regions such as
South Sudan, East Timor, and Kosovo have successfully argued their rights
to self-determination partly because Sudan, Indonesia, and Serbia were
unable to control violence and warfare in the regions.190  A few groups,
however, have had difficulty separating because of their central govern-
ment’s strength.191  Again, the international community will balance the
stability of the central government to determine whether a group has the
right to self-determination.
Third, a group seeking self-determination must demonstrate that its
region needed international help in some capacity because of the “brutality
and inefficacy of the central government.”192 This prong is a derivative of
the second criteria: once a group has successfully shown it is governed by a
weak central government, international authorities intervene to preserve or
re-establish peace.193  For example, NATO, the U.N., and the European
Union have all had a presence in Kosovo in its struggle for independence;
184. Id. at 60.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 61
187. See id. at 62.
188. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 2 SCR 217, ¶ 65 (1998) (“In individual terms,
the right to vote in elections to the [Canadian] House of Commons and the provincial
legislatures, and to be candidates in those elections, is guaranteed to ‘Every citizen of
Canada’ . . .  Historically, this Court has interpreted democracy to mean the process of
representative and responsible government and the right of citizens to participate in the
political process as voters . . . and as candidates.”).
189. STERIO, supra note 20, at 62.
190. Id.
191. For example, the Kurds have been denied external self-determination by the gov-
ernment of Turkey because of the strength of Turkey’s central government. See, e.g., M.J.
Kelly, supra note 175, at 390.
192. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 60.
193. Id. at 62.
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the U.N. led the referendum effort for East Timor and helped orchestrate
South Sudan’s independence.194 But groups that had strong central govern-
ments, such as Chechnya, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, were unable to
satisfy this third prong to the great powers approach.195  A higher degree of
involvement by the international community significantly improves a
group’s chances of attaining self-determination.
Lastly, a group seeking self-determination “must prove that external
actors, including the great powers, view its struggle as legitimate, and that
external actors, including the great powers, are ready to embrace it as a
new sovereign partner.”196  Sterio asserts that this fourth prong is disposi-
tive for a group of people to gain recognition.  For example, Kosovar Albani-
ans declared independence from Serbia in 2008.197  All the great powers,
excluding Russia, immediately recognized Kosovo as a new state.198  The
support from the great powers helped Kosovo in two critical ways.  First,
the support of virtually all of the great powers led Kosovo to declare inde-
pendence with confidence.199  Second, many neutral states accepted
Kosovo once they saw the support of the great powers.200  The influence of
the great powers also can be seen through South Sudan’s struggle for inde-
pendence.  South Sudan was unable to gain international recognition until
the group garnered United States’ support.201  Therefore, only entities that
have had the support of at least one of the great powers have succeeded in
gaining international recognition.202
E. The Great Powers Influence on Somaliland
The influence of the great powers on Somaliland’s claim for recogni-
tion cannot be understated.  The great powers theory of recognition calls
for (1) oppression; (2) weak central government of the mother state; (3)
some involvement by international authorities; and (4) external actors
viewing the claim as legitimate.  All but the last claim have been satisfied
time and time again in the case of Somaliland.
In viewing oppression, there must be a balance between the degree of
suffering of a people and the protection of state sovereignty.  The civil war
between Somalia and Somaliland led to the deaths of thousands of Somali-
landers through tactics such as destroying major Northern cities and
rounding up Somalilanders for execution.203  Even prior to the civil war,
194. See, e.g., id. at 62.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 63.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. The South Sudanese were ignored by the international community throughout
the Cold War and in the 1990s. After 9/11, the Western great powers began to fear the
rise of an influential Islamic state and thus turned to supporting South Sudan in order
to weaken Sudan’s central government. Id.
202. Others, such as the Biafrans and the Kurds, are forced to co-exist within their
original mother states. Id.
203. See Poore, supra note 59, at 128. See also GELDENHUYS, supra note 61, at 131.
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there were concerns of oppression when former Somalilanders were rou-
tinely excluded from political positions of power.204
The second requirement to the great powers theory for self-determina-
tion calls for a weak mother state.  Somalia’s inability to function as a gov-
ernment for a majority of Somaliland’s renewed existence is clear.  Since
the fall of Barre’s regime in 1991, clan warlords, militants, and Al
Shabaab— a group with connections to Al Qaeda— have fought for control
over the region, while a shaky transitional federal government has tried to
maintain control.205  Somalia’s federal government has failed to prevent Al
Shabaab’s bombings in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, or in surrounding
regions.  Al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for various types of suicide
attacks, “typically targeting Somali government officials, [African Union
Mission in Somalia], and perceived allies of the [Somali Federal Govern-
ment].”206  While Somalia’s government has been recognized as func-
tional,207 Al Shabaab has continued to be a threat within Somalia and in
neighboring countries.208
The third requirement for the great powers theory is the involvement
of international authorities who intervene to preserve or re-establish peace
due to the ineffectiveness of the weak central government. Many of the
great powers— in particular, the U.S. and U.K.— have intervened repeatedly
in Somalia prior to Somaliland’s independence in 1991,209 and have con-
tinued to intervene post-independence.210
Where Somaliland struggles is the fourth prong of the great powers
theory: whether external actors believe that their claim to recognition is
legitimate.  Numerous countries, including some of the great powers, have
a diplomatic relationship with Somaliland,211  but none have officially rec-
ognized Somaliland.  The U.S. has distanced itself from Somaliland’s strug-
gle for independence by reverting to the concept of “African solutions for
African problems.”212  Jendayi Frazer, in her capacity as Assistant Secre-
tary of State for African Affairs for the U.S., stated that the U.S. would
recognize Somaliland if the African Union (A.U.) first recognized Somali-
204. Former Somalilanders did not believe they were represented fairly until the
appointment of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal in 1967. See BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 34. R
205. See Watkins, supra note 17.
206. Al-Shabaab, THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, http://www.nctc.gov/
site/groups/al_shabaab.html.
207. See Watkins, supra note 17.
208. Al Shabaab most recently gained widespread publicity through their terrorist
attack on Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. See, e.g., id.; Al-Shabab Terrorists in Training
Find Inspiration in Kenya Mall Attack, PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.pbs.
org/newshour/bb/world-jan-june14-shabab_01-07/.
209. See, e.g., BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 42-44. R
210. See, e.g., http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm#p15.
211. Somaliland has relationships with the U.S., U.K., and France.  Somaliland also
holds diplomatic offices in Sweden, Kenya, Ethiopia, Norway, Belgium, Djibouti, South
Sudan, and Canada. Contracts and Addresses of the Somaliland Representative Offices
Around the World, THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND (last accessed May 11, 2014), http://
somalilandgov.com/country-profile/embasies/.
212. Schraeder, supra note 7.
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land.213  More than 5 years have passed since Frazer’s statement, but the
A.U. is not any closer to recognizing Somaliland.
F. Politics or International Law?
Through the great powers theory of self-determination, it is clear that
the great powers legitimize a people’s struggle for self-determination.  But
should the great powers’ political views override the international law on
self-determination?  Groups seeking self-determination are left wondering
what motivates the great powers in their decisions to support or not sup-
port a struggling group.  If the great powers decide to not give media cover-
age to a struggling people, then those people will remain unnoticed on the
global scene.214  If a great power sees that self-determination will allow
them to achieve unrelated personal goals, it will provide the support neces-
sary for a group to attain international recognition.  A great power may
also choose not to interfere with a group’s struggle for self-determination in
fear of angering another great power.215
While the great powers have to prioritize their own nation’s policy
interests, it is legally inappropriate to rest the law of self-determination on
a handful of nations with a disproportionate amount of power.  Sterio
points out that the legal criteria for self-determination has been “brushed
aside by the great powers’ rule.”216  Somaliland’s argument for self-deter-
mination highlights the tension between the legal approach to self-determi-
nation and the political interests of the great powers.  Throughout
Somaliland’s recent history, many of the great powers have offered support
to both the Somali government and Somalilanders, including the United
States, United Kingdom, Russia, and China.217  The doctrine of earned
sovereignty has been proposed as a solution to the rule of great powers,
and, more broadly, self-determination in the post-colonial world.
V. Solution to the Tension: Earned Sovereignty
A. Emergence of Earned Sovereignty
A new approach to attaining independence focuses on demonstrating
213. Jamal Gabobe, What Jendayi Frazer Said About Somaliland and Somalia, THE
SOMALILAND TIMES, available at http://somalilandtimes.net/sl/2008/332/71.shtml.
214. For example, the world has heard little about Tibet in recent years due to China’s
totalitarian control of all national media outlets. See Sterio, supra note 20, at 64. But the
genocide in Darfur, Sudan by the Janjaweed militia groups with alleged support from the
Sudanese government was largely ignored until 2003 when media outlets were able to
broadcast the atrocities. See id.
215. For example, the great powers have turned a blind eye to Chechnya due to the
significant interest of a key great power, Russia. See id. at 66.
216. Id. at 69.
217. BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 42.  Somalia and Somaliland not only changed alli- R
ances with nations, but their form of government as well –  from protectorate under the
United Nations, to communism, to a shaky form of democracy. See Ssekandi, Somali FM
Hails Somalia-China Relations, ENGLISH.NEWS.CN, Jan. 30, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english/africa/2013-01/30/c_132139474.htm.
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to the outside world that the state has “earned” its right to sovereignty.218
Earned sovereignty is the conditional and progressive devolution of sover-
eign powers and authority from a state to a substate under international
supervision.219  The doctrine emerged from the fourth criterion of the
Montevideo Convention, “the capacity to enter into international rela-
tions.”220  Earned sovereignty has its origins in the peace agreements relat-
ing to the state practice of Serbia and Montenegro, East Timor, the
Northern Ireland and Bougainville agreements, and the proposed agree-
ments for the Palestine Road Map and Western Sahara.221  The purpose of
earned sovereignty is to:
seek[ ] to bridge the approaches of sovereignty and self-determination by
providing a mechanism whereby some substate entities may be guided
through a process of transition to statehood or heightened autonomy in such
a way so as not to undermine the legitimate interests of parent states and of
the international community.222
It is designed to create an avenue for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts
by providing for the managed devolution of sovereign authority and func-
tions from a state to substate entity.223  It also acts as a reward for states
that have achieved statehood through peaceful interactions with the inter-
national community.224  In some instances, the substate entity may
acquire authority and functions sufficient to enable it to seek international
recognition, while in others the substate entity may only acquire authority
to operate within a stable system of heightened autonomy.225
Earned sovereignty first appeared under the name “intermediate sover-
eignty” in a 1998 memorandum issued by the Public International Law &
Policy Group and the International Crisis Group as a proposed solution to
the conflict in Kosovo.226  Earned sovereignty has been successfully used
as an approach to resolving conflict in both Kosovo and South Sudan.227
There are three core elements to earned sovereignty and three optional
elements.  The core elements are: (1) shared sovereignty, (2) institution
building, and (3) eventual determination of the state’s final status.228
Shared sovereignty represents the state and substate entity both exercising
sovereign authority and functions over a defined territory.229  Institution
218. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 175.
219. See Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Future of Sovereignty-Based Conflict
Resolution, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 128, 131.
220. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 175.
221. Williams, supra note 219, at 131.
222. Id. at 134.
223. Id.
224. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 175. For example, peoples such as the Kosovar
Albanians or the East Timorese have earned their right to exist as independent states,
whereas peoples that have been labeled violent such as Republika Srpska or Chechnya
have not. Id.
225. Williams, supra note 219, at 134.
226. Id. at 132.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 135.
229. Id.
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building represents when the substate entity, sometimes with assistance
from the international community, undertakes to construct institutions for
self-government and build institutions capable of exercising increasing sov-
ereign authority and functions.230  Eventual determination of the final sta-
tus of the substate entity is usually determined by a referendum.
Sometimes, the final status of the substate entity is determined through a
negotiated settlement between the state and substate entity with the assis-
tance of an international mediator.231
The three optional elements of earned sovereignty are: (1) phased sov-
ereignty, (2) conditional sovereignty, and (3) constrained sovereignty.232
Phased sovereignty is defined as the accumulation by the substate entity of
increasing sovereign authority and functions over a specified period of
time prior to the determination of final status.233  Conditional sovereignty
lists certain benchmarks that the substate entity is required to meet.234
Conditional sovereignty may be applied to the accumulation of increasing
sovereign authority and functions by the substate entity, or applied to the
determination of the substate’s final status.235  Lastly, constrained sover-
eignty involves continued limitations on the sovereign authority and func-
tions of the new state, such as continued international administrative and
military presence.236  It also provides limits on the right of the state to
undertake territorial association with other states.237
Critics like Mandani view any threat to sovereignty as intolerable,
thereby treating earned sovereignty with suspicion. Concerns of ethno-
nationalism and population transfers that the successor states to the Soviet
Union and former Yugoslavia faced come to mind as well. Would Somali-
land fall into a similar trap?  These concerns that Somaliland will fall into a
pattern similar to the Soviet Union may be unwarranted. While ethno-
nationalism through the “Greater Somalia” mission led to the unification of
Somalia and Somaliland, the boundary split between the two nations
reflects the clan divisions. As I.M. Lewis, a widely recognized anthropolo-
gist on the Somali people, has observed: “clanship remains a more compre-
hensively powerful focus of identity in Somali society.”238 The difference
between clanship and ethnicity has a huge practical implication in Somalia
and Somaliland’s case: “solidarity at the level of the ethnic group (the
nation) is less binding than that within the clan structure.”239 The con-
cerns arising from a theoretical analysis of earned sovereignty, therefore,
are not as prevalent here.
230. Id. at 136
231. Id.
232. Id. at 135.
233. Id.at 136.
234. Id. at 137.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. I. M. Lewis, Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox, 74(4) AFR.:
JOURNAL OF THE INT’L AFRI. INST. 489, 511 (2004).
239. Id.
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B. Somaliland’s Earned Sovereignty
Somaliland’s case for independence satisfies the underlying purpose
of earned sovereignty by maintaining peace while striving for increased
power over its territory.  Since 1991, Somaliland has worked with interna-
tional organizations and other nations to help provide peace and stability
to the region.240  Because Somaliland has functioned for twenty years with-
out any supervision from the international community, Somaliland’s claim
to recognition does not fit neatly into the three required and three optional
elements of earned sovereignty.  Shared sovereignty and phased sover-
eignty both involve a detailed arrangement for dual sovereignty with the
mother state.241  Through benchmarks for increased transfer of authority
and functions, there is a gradual transformation to democratic rule that
simultaneously respects the territorial integrity of the mother state.242
Somaliland could not engage in either stage because Somalia did not have
a recognized, functioning government until 2013.243  The inability to
engage in dialogue with Somalia’s government forced Somaliland to con-
tinue on its path to recognition.
The difficulty in line drawing as to where Somaliland lies in the
earned sovereignty scheme can easily be remedied by the actions of the
international community.  The crucial element missing from the three-part
test for earned sovereignty is a timeline for the determination of final sta-
tus.  The international community needs to help Somalia and Somaliland
determine a deadline for when Somaliland will be recognized as indepen-
dent by the international community; such a deadline would be similar to
the deadlines set for U.N. trusteeships.  It is typical for the international
community— even after independence— to continue to monitor certain
tasks to ensure the continued compliance with the prior phase
conditions.244
Somaliland has managed to develop a state structure comprised of a
popularly elected constitutionally-based government.245  The government
has certain enumerated rights, and has been able to fulfill their duties
through exercising some “control over its borders, manag[ing] certain pub-
lic assets, lev[ying] taxes, intervene[ing] in the market, formulat[ing] devel-
opment policies and provid[ing] security for its citizens as competently as
many better resourced and recognized states in Africa.”246  Somaliland has
240. See BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 243-44. R
241. See Williams, supra note 219, at 135-36.
242. See id.
243. See, e.g., Watkins, supra note 17.
244. See Williams, supra note 219, at 135.  For example, the international community,
through a U.N. commission, had set a clear date for determining the final status of
Kosovo at the Raimbouillet Accords, the commission’s initial meetings.  The determina-
tion of final status was then transformed into an ongoing process in the United Nations
Standards before Status doctrine “whereby the international community required that
the conditions in [prior phases] be substantially met prior to undertaking negotiations
to settle Kosovo’s status.” Id.
245. See BRADBURY, supra note 5. R
246. Id.
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also managed to facilitate growth in the economic sector through the reha-
bilitation of infrastructure and social services.247  Most Somalilanders who
took refuge in neighboring countries during the war have returned, and
civil organizations have flourished.248
Conclusion
Over the last twenty-three years, Somaliland has gone from destruction
and despair to a self-governing territory that fulfills the criteria for state-
hood.  Mark Bradbury, a social analyst who has worked extensively in
Somalia and Somaliland, suggests that the key to reconciling the right to
territorial sovereignty and self-determination is through an ad hoc, fact-
intensive analysis in order to “understand the place on its own terms.”249
The rule of great powers suggests that politics, more than international
law, has dictated what groups are able to recognize their right to self-deter-
mination.  From this understanding, it is clear that the international com-
munity has a responsibility to rise up and take the lead in resolving this
issue. More importantly, an understanding of state building can help us
with all nations that are emerging from civil war.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
